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research article 
The Evolution of Search-and-Seizure Law: How New Hampshire and 
Federal Law Differ 
—Randall Lawrence–Hurt (Edited by Jennifer Lee) 
Within the American criminal justice system, an individual’s freedoms are protected by the very same government which, 
under certain circumstances, seeks to deprive that individual of those freedoms. For example, the law prohibits growing 
marijuana at home; but the law also provides that even if a police officer is positive you’re doing exactly that, s/he can’t 
enter your home and arrest you without first going through certain legal procedures. Even if your guilt is obvious, if the 
police ignore those legal procedures, the law will side with you, not with them. 
This is part of the long struggle in our nation’s history to balance the federal and state governments’ punitive powers and 
protective responsibilities over the citizenry. These powers and responsibilities are expressed in the United States 
Constitution and each state’s constitution, and applied by the United States Supreme Court and the supreme court of each 
state. Perhaps of most interest to us all are the protections provided 
by search-and-seizure laws. Each state’s laws regarding searches 
and seizures reflect the federal laws but are not identical, and can, 
within limits, be tailored to each state’s needs or preferences.  
During the summer of 2009, funded by a Summer Undergraduate 
Research Fellowship from the University of New Hampshire, I 
researched how the decisions handed down by the US Supreme 
Court affected search-and-seizure law and forced changes in the 
criminal justice systems of the states, specifically New Hampshire. 
While much is known about the US Supreme Court’s decisions and 
much has been written about their legacy, very little has been said 
about the changes within New Hampshire that those decisions 
caused: in particular, changes in police procedure, evidence 
admissibility, and court proceedings. My research sought to fill that 
void. 
After ten weeks, hundreds of hours in libraries, thousands of pages of case law, and countless cups of coffee, I compiled a 
thirty-page report covering in generous detail three inter-related topics: how the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment 
to the US Constitution by the US Supreme Court has evolved; how the interpretation of Article 19 of the NH Constitution 
by the New Hampshire Supreme Court has evolved, both by itself and in response to the US Supreme Court; and what all 
this means for the realities of law enforcement.  
That paper is too extensive to summarize here. In this article, I will address the historical context of modern search-and-
seizure law, particularly the major change that occurred in 1961, and then move on to consider the primary differences 
between New Hampshire and federal law, the role of the courts in creating and guiding changes in the law, and the 
opinions of state law enforcement officials regarding the present state of the law.  
 
The author reading search-and-seizure case law. 
The Law Before 1961 
The Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution holds that the people are to be "secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizure;" and further that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized." 
The Fourth Amendment was ratified as one of the original ten amendments on December 15th, 1791. These first ten 
amendments, known as “The Bill of Rights,” reflected the reluctance of many citizens to ratify the federal Constitution 
without clauses expressly prohibiting the federal government and its officers from certain actions. The Fourth Amendment 
specifically addressed the colonists’ recent experience with British soldiers, who routinely entered colonists’ homes 
without a warrant, or with a very vague or broadly worded one, and seized anything they desired. 
The few sentences of this amendment are the source of one of the most extensive bodies of case law, interpretation, and 
legal theory in the United States. What they mean has been debated and interpreted by courts and scholars since they were 
written. The protections they extend to the citizenry have been expanded, contracted, and redefined by the US Supreme 
Court for over two hundred years—a process which continues to this day. From their basic application to police searches 
of a car or home to their modern implications for wiretapping, electronic surveillance, and thermal imaging, these 
sentences serve to protect one of the rights United States citizens hold most dear: the right to be left alone. The motorist 
pulled over for speeding, the renter who keeps a bong on his bedroom dresser, and the college student walking around on 
Friday night with a backpack stuffed with "books" all exercise certain rights under the Fourth Amendment—rights which 
restrain police action whether the citizen knows it or not. 
The New Hampshire Constitution went into effect on June 2, 1784. Article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution 
provides, in language similar to that of the Fourth Amendment, what basic regulations apply to searches and seizures 
conducted by New Hampshire law enforcement. For over 150 years, Article 19 formed the basis of all decisions by the 
NH Supreme Court regarding whether a given search-and-seizure was legal, whether evidence obtained from it was 
admissible, whether a warrant was properly issued, and what exceptions to these rules existed. During that time, the NH 
Supreme Court was the final word on search-and-seizure law in New Hampshire. 
One notable difference between federal and New Hampshire search-and-seizure law resulted. Almost everyone knows that 
illegally seized evidence may not be used to convict someone. This principle, called the Exclusionary Rule, has been a 
part of federal jurisprudence since 1914. In that year, the US Supreme Court ruled that evidence "taken . . . in direct 
violation of the constitutional rights of the defendant may not be used against the defendant at trial." (Weeks v. United 
States, 232 U.S. 383) This ruling, however, applied only to federal officers and courts. New Hampshire law, as it had 
since the state’s constitution was ratified, continued to follow the principle that only the relevance of the evidence should 
matter when determining its admissibility; how it was obtained was not for the trial court to consider. Therefore, even if 
illegally seized by state officers, all relevant evidence (with the exception of coerced confessions) would be admitted at 
trial in New Hampshire courts. 
The Law After 1961 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, ratified in 1868, provided that no state could deprive its citizens of 
"Due Process of Law." Questions almost immediately arose about what this guarantee meant. Some people suggested the 
wording meant that no state could deprive its citizens of the protections listed in the first ten amendments to the US 
Constitution. (At the time, these ten amendments applied only to the federal government, although many states had similar 
protections in their constitutions). The US Supreme Court at first rejected this idea. Eventually, however, the Court began 
determining on a case-by-case basis which of these amendments the "Due Process Clause" required the States to abide by, 
that is, which of the Bill of Rights were included, or “incorporated," by the Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement.  
In 1961 the Court decided that the Fourteenth Amendment and its 
requirement that states not deprive their citizens of "Due Process of 
Law" meant that the protections of the Fourth Amendment were 
now applicable to the individual states. (The case which decided 
this was Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643.) Because the US Supreme 
Court is the final arbiter of what the Fourth Amendment protects, 
individuals could now appeal to that Court and claim that their 
Fourth Amendment rights had been violated by any law 
enforcement officer, whether federal, state, or local. Should it be 
determined that the Fourth Amendment was violated, the illegally 
seized evidence would be excluded from trial. The import of 
“Incorporation,” as the decision became known, was that it required 
all states to exclude evidence seized in violation of the federal 
Constitution, regardless of whether an Exclusionary Rule existed in 
the state’s own constitution. Therefore, New Hampshire now had to 
abide by the Exclusionary Rule of the federal Fourth Amendment. 
This ruling ended the biggest difference between federal and state 
laws regarding searches and seizures but did not bring them into 
total conformity. The US Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized 
that the Fourth Amendment is only the baseline of search-and-
seizure law, and that states are free to impose greater restrictions on police action than are required by federal law. The 
NH Supreme Court has noted that the state’s constitution "often will afford greater protection against the action of the 
State than does the federal Constitution."(State v. Settle, 122 N.H. 214)  
An example of this “greater protection” is the use of drug-sniffing dogs. The US Supreme Court has held that a federal 
officer may use a drug-sniffing dog to check your baggage or car for any reason. The Court does not consider that action a 
"search" and, therefore, it is not subject to the Fourth Amendment’s restrictions. (U.S. v. Place, 462 U.S. 696) The NH 
Supreme Court, however, has decided that Article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution is more protective in that area 
than is the Fourth Amendment. A New Hampshire police officer running a dog along the outside of your car or luggage is 
considered to be performing a “search.” At trial, the officer must be able to demonstrate that, before s/he conducted the 
search, s/he had an "articulable suspicion" that you possessed illegal drugs.(State v. Pellicci, 133 N.H. 523) If a judge 
determines the police officer didn’t have sufficient reason to so believe, any evidence the officer found would (probably) 
be excluded from use at trial. 
In both state and federal search-and-seizure law, restrictions on when and how an officer may conduct a search are 
important in protecting the rights of the citizenry. Here, again, New Hampshire is more protective in its requirements for 
issuing legal permissions, known as warrants, to search. 
Warrants and New Hampshire vs. Federal Law  
Broadly speaking, there are two types of searches law enforcement officers may conduct: searches conducted with a 
warrant and searches conducted without one (warrantless searches). A warrant can only be issued by a Justice of the Peace 
or a judge and represents the determination of that Justice or judge that sufficient evidence of wrongdoing exists to justify 
a search of a specific place and the seizure of specific items.  
All searches, to be considered legal, must be determined to be “reasonable,” a judgment largely left at the court’s 
discretion. One major guideline in determining whether a search was "reasonable," however, is whether a valid warrant to 
search was first obtained. This is because the supreme courts of both New Hampshire and the US have reached the 
conclusion that "Warrantless seizures are per se unreasonable unless they fall within the narrow confines of a judicially 
crafted exception."(State v. Boyle, 148 N.H. 306) Both courts have established very similar regulations for how a warrant 
to search may be issued. The differences lie in the exceptions to the warrant requirement which both courts have created. 
The United States Supreme Court in Washington,DC. 
 
Currently, there are two notable distinctions between New 
Hampshire and federal law regarding exceptions to the warrant 
requirement. The first is found in differing opinions the two 
courts have over the definition of what constitutes a “search.” 
The use of drug-sniffing dogs, discussed above, is an example 
of the courts’ different definitions. Because the NH Supreme 
Court is the final word on what the New Hampshire 
Constitution means, it is free to define "search" differently than 
does the US Supreme Court. 
The second major difference involves the validity of search 
warrants. The US Supreme Court has ruled that, assuming the 
officer applying for the warrant did not deliberately 
misrepresent the facts, if the magistrate issues the search 
warrant despite not having enough information to properly do 
so, the evidence seized pursuant to it is still considered legally 
seized. (This is known as the "Good Faith" exception.) Put more simply, evidence is considered legally seized according 
to federal law if there was no misconduct on the part of the officer, regardless of whether the magistrate erred in issuing 
the warrant. This is not the case in New Hampshire. According to the NH Supreme Court, evidence seized pursuant to an 
improperly issued warrant, whether or not the officers involved are to blame, violates the New Hampshire Constitution 
and may not be used at trial. This is another example of state law being more protective than federal law. 
The Law and Those who Enforce it 
While federal and state legislatures pass laws related to searches and seizures, it is police officers who apply the laws and 
courts which decide whether their application was legally, that is, constitutionally, correct. Thus, how a given officer 
understands search-and-seizure law will affect how s/he applies it; and whether s/he applied it correctly or incorrectly will 
be the issue for the court to decide. Much of the time these decisions are routine and do not result in any noticeable 
changes in search-and-seizure law. But every once in a while a new situation arises, and the courts must make new law. 
For example, the advent of computers and how police officers behaved when presented with the opportunity to search a 
computer’s files resulted in courts having to address an issue of searches and seizures which had never arisen before. It is 
primarily these situations, these decisions on the part of individual police officers, which cause search-and-seizure law to 
evolve. As such, I found it helpful in my research to interview police officers, prosecutors, and defense attorneys in New 
Hampshire about their opinions on the evolution of search-and-seizure law in this state and how the law should change, if 
at all. 
All the subjects interviewed agreed upon the importance of placing legal limitations on police action and of curbing the 
inclination of police to do whatever necessary to catch criminals. When asked whether the public should care if a criminal 
were convicted on the basis of illegally seized evidence, all the subjects replied in the affirmative. One police chief 
emphasized that "The public has an obligation to watch over what the police are doing, so that we don’t abuse our power." 
And a former prosecutor similarly stated that "People should still care. Democracy works best when people care about 
how Constitutional rights are implemented. And we should care, to avoid taking shortcuts." 
But when asked how the police should be controlled and whether the Exclusionary Rule (the rule prohibiting illegally 
seized evidence from being used against a defendant at trial) was the best means of control, the subjects differed. One 
defense attorney supported the Exclusionary Rule as being constitutionally justified and attacked the notion that civil 
remedies for police misconduct were sufficient, calling them "hardly appropriate," and saying that "People today have a 
hell of a lot more rights, because the courts have protected those rights." This position was supported by a prosecutor, who 
said "The only other remedy is a civil remedy, and you’re gonna have a tough time having a jury look at someone who’s 
committed a heinous crime and say ’well, we see that your rights were violated, we’re gonna give you a bunch of 
money.’" Several police chiefs agreed with this sentiment, one of them saying "I totally agree with the Exclusionary 
Rule." 
On the other side, however, both a police chief and a former prosecutor expressed reservations about the Exclusionary 
Rule. The chief called for a national debate on the issue and, when asked whether the Exclusionary Rule sacrifices too 
much public safety in order to protect individual rights, replied "Yeah, I think I would say that," and further pointed out 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court in Concord, NH. 
that "From my understanding and from what I’ve read over the years, we are the only nation in the world . . . that has the 
Exclusionary Rule." The former prosecutor, while not openly advocating an elimination of the Exclusionary Rule, did say 
that "If I were designing the system, I wouldn’t be in favor of the Exclusionary Rule. I think it’s an odd way to enforce 
Fourth Amendment rights." 
Several subjects expressed frustration at the fact that New Hampshire law is, in some respects, more restrictive of police 
action than federal law. One former prosecutor maintained that "Federal law has given greater discretion to law 
enforcement officers, and I think that discretion is generally well used." New Hampshire’s lack of a "Good Faith" 
exception to the Exclusionary Rule frustrated some police officers as well. Overall, though, the police officers interviewed 
did not seem to have strong objections to the law as it is. One police chief expressed this position well by saying "It’s 
what [the New Hampshire courts] say our Constitution says. States are allowed to have constitutions that provide their 
citizens with more rights, so to speak, than the federal Constitution, and that’s what they say." 
Whether this relatively disinterested attitude expressed by some subjects was simply professional demeanor or actual 
private opinion is unclear. On one level or another, though, all the police officers interviewed accepted the current legal 
situation in New Hampshire and recognized that it was their place to enforce the current law and not attempt to overtly 
change it. One police chief said "Those are the rules we play by," and another admitted that, even despite his dislike of the 
Exclusionary Rule, the strict regulations governing police power are "the nature of the world we live in, in the United 
States, and I’m not so sure that it shouldn’t be that way." 
Like it or not, that’s the way the law in New Hampshire is. It is more restrictive of police action than federal law and gives 
greater weight to the importance of individual privacy. It is the product of New Hampshire’s legal history and the 
philosophy of its supreme court, and it is a result of the federal system of government which the U.S. Constitution 
established. Above all, it is a subject of great importance to everyone, for search-and-seizure law is the most personal of 
law. 
Many thanks to Professor John Cerullo for his guidance and mentoring throughout my research, for proofreading more 
drafts of my paper than I think he’d care to remember, and for his unflagging faith in my ability. I also owe much 
gratitude to Dr. Charles Putnam for pointing me in the right direction from the very beginning, and for being a wealth of 
useful information. Thanks to my interview subjects, who sacrificed hours of their busy lives to answer my questions. And, 
of course, thanks to the Supreme Court of the United States. This research wouldn’t have been possible without it. 
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Doing scholarly research in a field where little has been done was very satisfying for Randall Lawrence-Hurt, 
a political science major from Tuftonboro, New Hampshire. For his Summer Undergraduate Research 
Fellowship, he spent many hours reading and comparing federal and New Hampshire search-and-seizure law 
cases. This resulted in a thirty-page report, which he then narrowed and focused for his Inquiry article. Randy 
met his (future) mentor, Dr. John Cerullo, in 2007 during the University of New Hampshire’s Justice Studies 
Budapest program. “I thoroughly enjoyed Professor Cerullo’s teaching style,” Randy said, “and his 
willingness to converse about a range of historical, political and legal topics with students.” Although the 
research topic Randy finally chose was not a specialty of Dr. Cerullo’s, Randy knew that he would “ask the 
questions I needed to answer and challenge me to pursue different ways of thinking,” which was “exactly the 
kind of mentoring I needed.” 
 
Randy graduated in December 2009 with a Bachelor’s of Arts in political science. He is taking time off from 
school to get a certificate for teaching English as a second language and also to continue his work with the 




Dr. John Cerullo, a professor of modern European history at the Manchester campus of the University of New 
Hampshire, arrived there in1981, when UNH-M was Merrimack Valley College. His research and teaching 
interests have ranged from intellectual history to legal theory and legal history. Over the last ten years, his 
research has been mainly on subjects pertaining to modern French history, and his most recent publications 
have addressed various aspects of the Dreyfus Affair and the theory and practice of French military justice 
prior to World War I. As faculty supervisor of the Justice Studies Budapest Program in the fall of 2007, he 
taught a course titled "Law and the Legacy of the 20th Century: Issues in Contemporary European 
Jurisprudence," which Randy attended. 
 
It was enormously gratifying to work with Randy on this project,” Dr. Cerullo said. “He is one of the finest 
students I have known in my nearly thirty years as an academic. I learned a great deal from him about the 
theory and practice of criminal justice in New Hampshire, and especially about Fourth Amendment issues.” 
The fact that New Hampshire legal history is nearly untouched by scholars, Dr. Cerullo noted, is almost 
certainly attributable to there being only one law school in the state, Franklin Pierce, which is a rather young 
institution. “There is plenty of work to be done in this field,” he said. “I hope Randy will return to it someday, 
and I hope other students will be inspired by his achievement to address other aspects of it.” 
